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Abstract 
Due to the growing number of green bond issues, a lack of mandatory standards and thus the growing 
phenomenon of greenwashing, an increasingly greater role is assumed by external auditors who are called upon 
to certify the ‘greenness’ of green bonds. These include rating agencies, which may be called on to express a 
green rating for each issue of green bonds. Based on a unique dataset made up of 66 green bond issues together 
with their respective green ratings from 2015 to 2020, the aim of this paper is to test the relationship between 
issuers’ board compositions and the green rating assigned to each bond issue. The results obtained confirm some 
conclusions already present in the existing literature and also open a new field of research concerning the green 
bond market, which has so far been little analysed, especially with reference to corporate governance.  
Keywords: green bond, green bond rating, board composition, board diversity 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, of the social and responsible investments (SRI) available on the market, green bonds have gained 
increasing interest from investors. A green bond is issued with the aim of supporting projects that have a positive 
impact on the environment, such as the development of clean energy, the sustainable use of land, and energy 
efficiency. The Climate Bond Initiative (CBI) reports that in 2019 the green bond market included issues to a 
value exceeding USD 250 billion. The greatest growth occurred in Europe, with an increase of USD 50 billion 
compared to 2018 (+74%), representing 57% of global expansion. Within the private sector, in recent years 
financial corporations have had the highest market share of issues; however, non-financial corporations reached 
the same level in 2019. In the same year, building, energy and transport were the three largest categories as 
regards green bond issues.  
The attractiveness of green bonds to investors, which is generated by a growing concern as regards 
environmental issues, may be a temptation for many companies to issue bonds with a green label but without a 
real intention to allocate the money raised to environmental projects (the so-called ‘greenwashing’ phenomenon). 
In order to distinguish real green bonds from those which are greenwashed, in June 2018 the International 
Capital Market Association (ICMA) issued the Green Bond Principles (GBP), specific guidelines for identifying 
a green bond. They can be summarized in the following four points: i) the bond issuer must clearly and 
unequivocally identify the destination of bond revenues; ii) the bond destination projects must be included on a 
specific list of categories and must be selected through a rigid and objective process; iii) the issuer must ensure 
maximum transparency in communicating the management of the bond flows; iv) reports must be published to 
keep investors updated on the progress of the financed projects.  
However, GBP are not mandatory; issuers may or may not follow them. For this reason, the ICMA has 
introduced a check on the true nature of green bonds to be carried out by an external auditor who must possess 
the characteristics of independence, professionalism, integrity, diligence and confidentiality. The auditor’s task is 
to draw up a report for each green bond issue, analysing the issuance procedures and the underlying project/s. 
More specifically, the issuers can obtain a merit judgment on an individual green bond issue by choosing 
between: a) second party opinion: a certification on compliance with the GBP prepared by institutions with high 
expertise in the environmental sector and which are independent from the issuer; b) verification: the issuer can 
request an independent verification of the traceability of the green bond revenues, on the soundness of the 
financed environmental project and the suitability of the reporting; c) certification: issued by qualified third 
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parties and experts, it must evaluate the green bond and the use of proceeds in compliance with the GBP; d) 
green rating: rating agencies issue a specific green rating for each green bond issue. It is important to underline 
that the green rating is different from the issuer rating: the green rating is based on the evaluation of 
environmental performance of the green bond and the project underlying the issue itself. It should not to be 
confused with the issuer’s rating, which is based on specific characteristics of the issuer. The 2019 CBI report 
highlights that about 60% of green bonds issued had a second party opinion certification, while the green rating 
option covered about 3% of the issues (equal to USD 8 billion of issuance). The rating agencies that issued the 
highest number of green ratings included Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, CCX, China Bond Rating, R&J, JCR and 
RAM. At the international level, from 2015 to the end of June 2020 there were 79 green bond issues with green 
ratings.  
For each of these 79 issues, during the investigation described in this paper the issuer was identified and 
socio-demographic information for each member of the board collected. Considering the lack of information 
available for some issuers, a unique dataset made up of 66 issues (83.54% of the total) was created. The purpose 
of this research is to verify whether there is a relationship between the board composition of the issuer and the 
green bond rating, based on this unique dataset. The working hypothesis is that the board of directors is a group 
of people and their decisions are made by the majority of them. The issuing of green bonds depends upon several 
factors and, among them, the directors’ interest in the environment may influence their choice regarding these 
issues. This research attempts to establish whether there is a relationship between board composition and (green) 
bond issues. If such a relationship exists, it could be exploited in the opposite direction by investors in their 
assessment of bond issues. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to analyse the relationship between 
companies’ board composition and the rating attributed to green bond issues.  
The results obtained are important from a theoretical and academic perspective because they confirm existing 
literature on board composition and board diversity, adding an original analysis concerning the recent 
phenomenon of green bonds. Furthermore, from the investors’ point of view, our results may allow identification 
of the best green bonds through consideration of board composition. In other words, a ranking of the quality of 
green bond issues could be achieved by analysing the issuer’s board composition. In addition, this research 
should stimulate debate between researchers and regulators as to the desirability of establishing a green 
certification for boards of directors.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main literature on board composition 
and board diversity and introduces the research hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the sample used in the analysis 
and Section 4 shows the obtained results. Section 5 discusses the obtained results and concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
The variables most widely used in the literature to describe the impact of corporate governance on ESG topics 
are related to board size, the presence of women on the board, the proportion of independent directors, the age of 
board members, their level of education, and nationality (e.g., Post et al., 2011; Rao & Tilt, 2016; Setò-Pamies, 
2015). In the sub-sections below, I develop my hypotheses for each of these characteristics.  
2.1 Board Size 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) and Pathan (2009) argue that board size depends on a firm’s complexity, so its 
sector and size are important factors influencing the number of directors. Baker and Gompers (2003), Kocher 
and Sutter (2005) and Coles et al. (2008) demonstrate that firms with complex businesses need larger boards 
because of the difficulties involved in monitoring and advising such corporations.  
Allegrini and Greco (2013) find a positive and significant effect of board size on governance disclosure in Italy. 
Esa and Ghazali (2012) demonstrate a positive effect of board size on the extent of CSR disclosure in Malaysia. 
However, Giannarakis (2014) does not report a significant impact of board size on ESG disclosure. 
Laksmana (2008) and Guest (2009) argue that smaller boards might have a low degree of diversification in terms 
of education, expertise, gender and stakeholder representation. According to De Andres et al. (2005) and Ahmed 
et al. (2006), smaller boards are expected to be more effective in monitoring and controlling firm governance 
than larger boards. In particular, Ahmed et al. (2006) and Dey (2008) find that the commitment of directors is 
higher on smaller boards.  
In the light of the above evidence, I advance the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The larger the board of directors, the lower the green bond rating. 
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2.2 Board Age 
Age diversity within the BoD is expressed as the coexistence of different generations, and therefore of values, 
motivational goals and experiences influencing the decision-making processes adopted by directors. According 
to Botwinick (1977) and Burke and Light (1981), cognitive abilities including learning ability, memory and 
reasoning decrease as people age. Moreover, Carlson and Karlsson (1970) and Vroom and Pahl (1971) 
demonstrate that older executives tend to avoid risky decisions.  
However, it has been shown that the relationship between age and risk-propensity is not clear. Campbell (1987) 
highlights the fact that younger managers seem to handle new and creative ideas better than older managers; 
according to Guthrie and Olian (1991), they tend to implement more risky and innovative growth strategies. 
According to Morin and Suarez (1983), Brown (1990), Bakshi and Chen (1994) and Palsson (1996) a positive 
correlation between age and risk-propensity is identifible. Riley and Chow (1992), Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) 
and Harrison et al. (2007) show that risk aversion decreases with age up until 65 years of age and then increases 
significantly. Cohen and Einay (2007) find a U-shape in the relationship between age and risk-seeking. Thus 
senior advisors are more experienced and represent a form of accumulated skill-based competencies, while 
younger directors seem to be more dynamic, smarter, open to technological change, and active in driving 
business success and future planning (Handajani et al., 2014).  
However, age is negatively associated with environmental attitudes and knowledge of environmental issues 
(Diamantopoulos et al., 2003). Hafsi and Turgut (2013) argue that a board’s average age has no effect on the 
extent of CSR disclosure, while according to Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2015) a board of mixed age composition 
improves the integration of ESG issues into management processes.  
Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The younger the board, the higher the green bond rating. 
2.3 Board Independence 
Several studies document a positive relationship between board independence and CSR (Chen & Jaggi, 2000; 
Amhed et al., 2006; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Post et al., 2011; Jizi et al., 2014; Ong & Djajadikerta, 2018). Kaymak 
and Bektas (2017) indicate that board independence and board size are strongly and positively related to several 
CSR practices. Ibrahim and Angelidis (1995) and Ibrahim et al. (2003) find that independent directors are more 
concerned about charitable and philanthropic themes associated with CSR, than inside directors. Webb (2004) 
finds that firms that engage in CSR initiatives tend to have more independent directors. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Lim et al. (2007), Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010), Nurhayati et al. (2015) 
and Naciti (2019) find that the presence of independent directors on boards has a negative impact on social and 
environmental disclosure while Mallin et al. (2013) find the same relationship with reference to environmental 
performance. Further studies document a non-significant association (Walls & Hoffman, 2013; Rao & Tilt, 2016; 
Walls & Berrone, 2017).  
According to Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Jo and Harjoto (2011) a greater proportion of independent directors 
increases focus on social and environmental issues, while Holtz and Sarlo Neto (2014) find a positive 
relationship between board independence and ESG disclosures. Cucari et al. (2018) and Gallego-Alvarez and 
Pucheta-Martínez (2020) document a significant positive association between companies’ board independence 
and CSR involvement. Further, Hussain et al. (2018), Ibrahim and Hanefah (2016) and Cullinan et al. (2019) find 
that independent directors are associated with higher levels of CSR performance. 
In consideration of the above evidence, I advance the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship between the number of independent directors on the board and the 
green bond rating. 
2.4 Board Gender Diversity 
Regarding the relationship between board diversity and CSR outcomes, Post et al. (2011) and Ferrero-Ferrero et 
al. (2015) find that women directors encourage companies to adopt a more socially responsible approach. 
Generally, the literature suggests that firms with more women on their boards tend to act in more socially 
responsible ways than those with no women or fewer women. Bear et al. (2010), Setó-Pamies (2015), Ibrahim 
and Hanefah (2016) and Matuszak et al. (2019) find that the presence of females on the board is significantly and 
positively associated with CSR disclosure.  
Further, female directors on boards may enhance companies’ awareness of environmental and social issues and 
promote the adoption of proactive strategies to respond to corporate stakeholders’ social and ethical demands and 
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expectations (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2016; Ben-Amar et al., 2017; Hollindale et al., 2019). Boulouta (2013), 
Hussain et al. (2018) and Cullinan et al. (2019) argue that female directors enhance the sustainability 
performance of a company. Moreover, several studies suggest that firms with a higher percentage of females on 
the board present a higher level of charitable giving (Wang & Coffey, 1992; Williams, 2003), more favorable 
work environments (Bernardi et al., 2006), higher levels of environmental CSR (Post et al., 2011) and more 
apprehension concerning climate change (Ciocirlan & Pettersson, 2012). However, some studies (e.g., Konrad et 
al., 2008; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2012, 2014; Manita et al., 2018) point out that to have a significant and 
positive impact on sustainability and corporate governance, there must be at least three women on a BoD. 
Specifically, Post et al. (2011) argue that boards of directors with three or more female members have a high 
regard for environmental issues.  
There are also studies with different, contradictory results. According to Kilic et al. (2015) and Glass et al. (2016) 
there is a weak, statistically significant positive impact of board gender diversity on social and environmental 
reporting, while Deshenes et al. (2015) and Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) find a negative association between 
social and environmental practices and the presence of females on a board. Other studies (Khan, 2010; Walls et 
al., 2012; Galbreath, 2013; Mallin et al., 2013; Amran et al., 2014; Giannarakis, 2014; Alazzani et al., 2017) find 
no significant relationship between board gender diversity and a firm’s social and environmental policies.  
Based on this literature, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 4. The presence of women on the board positively affects the green bond rating.  
2.5 Educational Level 
Many studies (e.g., Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wailderdsak & Suehiro, 2004) 
consider educational level a good proxy for human capital, knowledge, or intellectual competence. In the 
literature the subject studied is also considered. Christy et al. (2010) show that the proportion of board members 
holding a financial degree is negatively associated with the market risk of equity in Australia. Litov et al. (2014) 
find that lawyer directors reduce corporate risk-taking and increase firm value. Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) 
argue that directors with academic backgrounds can enhance the competitive advantage of firms by facilitating 
access to and the absorption of external knowledge spillover.  
Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. The higher the proportion of economic and financial degrees held by the members of the board, 
the higher the green bond rating.  
2.6 Board Nationality 
The debate on board diversity in terms of nationality contrasts a heterogeneous board with its homogeneous 
counterpart (Hambrick et al., 1996). Rao and Tilt (2016) argue that national diversity in heterogeneous boards 
improves the quality of decision making for social and environmental actions that promote higher sustainability 
performance. Harjoto et al. (2019) find that board diversity in terms of nationality is positively associated with 
corporate social performance and Naciti (2019) demonstrates a positive relationship between board nationality 
diversity and firm sustainability performance. However, Anazonwu et al. (2018) using a sample of listed 
manufacturing firms in Nigeria, find no significant positive influence of board nationality diversity on firm 
sustainability reports, and Janggu et al. (2014), considering 100 publicly listed companies in Malaysia, find that 
foreign directors do not have a significant influence on sustainability disclosure. 
Thus, the literature on the relationship between board nationality diversity and the ESG issue is controversial and 
heterogeneous. In formulating my hypothesis, I therefore consider the board of directors as a group of people 
who have to make a specific decision about the issuing of green bonds. From this perspective, according to 
Gibson (2004), members of a group from different cultures are more likely to respond differently to the same 
event or managerial decision-making situation. Moreover, Souren et al. (2004) argue that diversity in ethnic 
origin and nationality appears to interfere with group processes more than does homogeneity in organizational 
teams. On the contrary, Zhang et al. (2007) argue that homogeneous teams share common views and are likely to 
interpret and evaluate situational events and management practice in similar ways, i.e., they generally report 
stronger affinity than heterogeneous teams.  
Based on the above considerations, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 6. The higher the number of directors of the same nationality on a board, the higher the green bond 
rating. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
From 2015 to the end of June 2020, at the international level there were 79 green bond issues accompanied by a 
green rating. For each of them, the following information was collected: the green rating attributed to the single 
issue, the name of the green bond issuer and the board composition of each issuer. For each board member, 
principal socio-demographic information was gathered. Table 1 lists and describes the variables used in this study 
and shows the expected sign of their impact on the green bond rating. Unfortunately, for some issuers it was not 
possible to collect all the information of interest: these issuers were excluded from the sample. As a result, the 
sample consists of 66 green bond issues, representing 83.54% of the total.  
 
Table 1. Description of variables 
Variable Description  Expected sign 
Dependent variable:  
greenrating The rating assigned by an agency to each green bond issue in the sample. It ranges from 0 (worst level) 
to 3 (best level). 
 
   
Independent variables:  
sector Dummy variable: equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the banking, financial and insurance sector; 0 
otherwise 
 
Ndirectors Number of directors on the board for each company  - 
age The average age of the directors on the board for each company - 
independent The percentage of independent directors on the board for each company + 
women The share of women on the board for each company + 
degree The percentage of graduate directors on the board for each company + 
findegree The percentage of graduates in Economics and Finance on the board for each company + 
nationality Dummy variable: 1 if the percentage of directors of the same nationality on the board for each 
companyis at least 75%; 0 otherwise  
+ 
tenor The length of loans in years  
amount The logarithm of the amount of each issue (in USD)  
currency  Dummy variable: 0 if the issue currency is USD; 1 if the issue currency is EUR; 2 if the issue currency 
is JPY; 3 otherwise 
 
 
In Table 1 the ‘tenor’ measures the time in years from origination to maturity date. It is used as a control variable 
as suggested in the studies by Bauer and Hann (2010), Cooper and Uzun (2015) and Eichhholtz et al. (2019). 
‘Amount’ indicates the bond issue amount used as a control variable in the studies by Bauer and Hann (2010), 
Cooper and Uzun (2015), Eichhholtz et al. (2019) and Oikonomou et al. (2014). Given the different currencies 
used for the issues, ‘currency’ was also used as a control variable. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics 
of the variables used in the analysis while Table 3 shows the correlation matrix.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
greenrating 2.7273 0.6690 0 3 
sector 0.4091 0.4954 0 1 
Ndirectors 7.8333 4.9071 1 18 
age 58.2762 7.4835 35 72 
independent 0.1215 0.1903 0 0.67 
women 0.1103 0.1358 0 0.67 
degree 0.9670 0.0624 0.75 1 
findegree 0.5076 0.2637 0 1 
nationality 0.9242 0.2667 0 1 
tenor 9.2121 7.4349 2 40 
amount 21.1191 1.9117 14.40 23.63 
currency  1.7121 0.9243 0 3 
 
Table 2 shows the green bond rating is on average very high, 2.7 out of a maximum value of 3. The average 
number of directors is 7.8 while the average age is around 58 years old. The average number of independent and 
women directors is not particularly high: 12.15 % and 11.03% respectively. More in detail, 43 companies have 
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no independent directors while 30 have no women on their boards. The level of education is on average very 
high: 96.70% of directors are graduates. Moreover, 50% of directors have a degree in economics and finance. 
About 10.6% of the issuers have a board made up of at least 75% directors of the same nationality. The average 
tenor of the issued bonds is 9 years with a very high variability (SD = 7.43).  
 

























































greenrating 1            
sector 0.0633 1           
Ndirectors -0.1265 -0.1487 1          
age -0.2341 0.0206 0.1356 1         
independent -0.1616 -0.0556 0.2165 -0.0823 1        
women -0.3022 -0.2054 0.2742 -0.1520 0.2494 1       
degree -0.0643 0.0507 0.0315 0.0285 -0.1053 -0.0202 1      
findegree -0.1712 0.1290 0.0988 -0.4163 0.1586 0.0033 -0.0247 1     
nationality -0.0314 0.2382 -0.1862 -0.0397 -0.0371 -0.1523 -0.1527 -0.1077 1    
tenor -0.0872 -0.2703 -0-0332 -0.0173 -0.0723 -0.0212 -0.1438 -0.1513 0.0548 1   
amount 0.2632 0.1920 0.0864 0.2545 -0.1357 -0.4128 0.1114 -0.1575 0.0766 0.0752 1  
currency -0.0045 0.2275 -0.0616 0.0540 0.1311 -0.2028 0.1900 0.0470 0.2223 -0.2238 0.4628 1 
 
In order to test our research hypotheses, the following ordered logit regressions were run: =	 + 	 + 	 + 	 + 	 + 	 +	 + 	 + + + + ɛ                       (1) =	 + 	 + 	 + 	 + 	 + 	 +	 + + + + ɛ                                      (2) 
The ordered logit model is justified bearing in mind that the bond rating presents a specific increasing order from 
the lower to the higher. In (1) the percentage of degree-holdingdirectors and the share of directors with an 
economic and financial degree were considered; in (2) the percentage of directors with an economic and 
financial degree only.  
4. Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the analysis; the estimates reported in column (1) consider equation (1) while the 
results in column (2) are related to equation (2).  
 
Table 4. The determinants of the green bond rating 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
sector 0.796 0.693 
 (1.027) (0.823) 
Ndirectors -0.204* -0.204* 
 (0.123) (0.122) 
age 0.0736 0.0706 
 (0.0550) (0.0573) 
independent 6.364*** 6.286*** 
 (2.436) (2.407) 
women -3.759 -4.214 
 (3.949) (3.668) 
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degree -2.443 - 
 (6.212) - 
findegree -4.059** -3.948** 
 (1.905) (1.685) 
nationality -0.0109 0.112 
 (1.880) (1.799) 
tenor -0.128** -0.126* 
 (0.0647) (0.0652) 
amount 0.765*** 0.740*** 
 (0.283) (0.281) 
currency -1.150* -1.173** 
 (0.609) (0.594) 
Observations 66 66 
Pseudo R2 0.2992 0.2973 
Note. Ordered logit regression. The dependent variable is greenrating. The table reports the odds ratio; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Overall, the results reported in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 converge, allowing a single comment on both.The 
first significant result that emerges is that the number of directors on the board has a negative impact on the 
green bond rating. This result corroborates the existing literature in favour of smaller boards and thus H1 is 
confirmed. H2 is not confirmed, as the average age of directors has no significant impact on the attribution of the 
green rating. Table 4 shows a very strong positive and significant relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and the level of rating expressed for the bond issues, so H3 is confirmed. On the contrary, 
H4 is rejected,given that the percentage of women on the board has no significant impact on the green bond 
rating. This can be justified by the low number of women on the boards of the issuers examined. The percentage 
of graduates on the board does not have a significant impact on the green bond rating, while the percentage of 
directors with a degree in economics and finance has a significant influence on the green rating. However, this 
impact is negative,so H5 is rejected. H6 is rejected as well because directors being of the same nationality has no 
impact on the green rating. The results obtained from the control variables included in the model are also 
interesting. In fact, the longer the bond tenor, the lower the rating attributed to the green bond. Viceversa, the 
higher the value of the issue, the better the rating level obtained by the green bond. Finally, the lowest ratings are 
assigned to dollar issues.  
5. Discussion and Conclusions  
The results obtainedfrom the analysis confirm and corroborate some conclusions found in the existing literature, 
opening a new field of research linked to green bond issues and the related quality certifications. In particular, in 
the literature board size gives rise to two opposing strands: on the one hand, many studies demonstrate the 
importance of larger boards, while others advocate the efficiency and effectiveness of smaller boards. With 
reference to the rating level obtained bygreen bond issues, the results presented in this paper favour smaller 
boards. 
In the literature, the role of independent directors on the board does not lead to converging conclusions. The 
present analysis supports their positive role in obtaining a better rating for green bond issues. 
Contrary to our expectations, directors holding an economic and financial degree have a negative impact on the 
level of the green bond rating. This unexpected result may be due to a combination of determinants: firstly, the 
average age of board members, which is quite high. This supports the idea that the degree courses of these 
directors did not consider environmental issues, in contrast with current study programs in many economics 
faculties. Secondly, and as a consequence, these directors are more oriented towards obtaining short-term 
performance, while green investments take much longer to produce their effects.  
Particular attention should be paid to the meaning of the control variables included in the analysis. The negative 
relationship between bond tenor and the bond rating can be explained by the fact that long term uncertainty 
about the macroeconomic scenario is higher than over a shorter period. Therefore, the issuer’s financial solvency 
could be compromised over the longer term, with negative effects on bonds’ security. Furthermore, the larger the 
bond issue size, the greater the possibility of its market remaining liquid. For this reason, the results obtained 
showed a positive relationship between the total amount of the issues and the bond rating. Finally, the negative 
relationship between the bond rating and dollar issues may be due to the fact that the majority of the bonds 
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included in the analysis were issued in Euros while dollar issues are still quite modest. In conclusion, the results 
obtained suggest some characteristics that green bond issues should have in order to obtain a high level of rating: 
being a large issue, not having a long tenor and not being in US dollars.  
The green bond market offers many avenues for future research. It is still an area which has received little 
in-depth attention,and which presents multiple facets to be analysed, including that addressed in this paper. 
Constructive debate and discussion between academics and supervisory authorities would be useful, in order to 
evaluate the need to define standards so as to permit certification of the green propensity of the boards of 
individual companies. This could greatly help investors, especially those in the retail sector, who are interested in 
allocating their investments to companies that are attentive to environmental issues. Indeed, the topic of SRI 
attracts much attention from investors, who are faced with a plethora of investment opportunities. However, very 
often they are not able to determine the truthfulness and quality of the proposed investment. Thus external 
certification, recognized by the supervisory authorities on the basis of compliance with predefined 
standards,including at the level of the composition of boards of directors, could be useful for dispelling some of 
the doubts interfering with investors’ decision-making processes.  
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